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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 03-4385
                                                    
CARL CORLEY,
                        Appellant
   v.
JOANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner
of Social Security
___________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-00019J)
District Judge:  The Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 12, 2004
BEFORE: NYGAARD, McKEE, and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 29, 2004)
2___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
This case involves a claim for disability insurance benefits under Title II of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433.  Appellant Carl M. Corley appeals from
an order entered by the District Court granting the Commissioner of Social Security’s
motion for summary judgment.  The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We will
affirm.
I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we recount the facts
and the procedural background of this case only as they pertain to our analysis.  
Corley is a 58-year old male with a high school diploma who worked as a mechanic and
tow truck driver.  He was fired in December 1993.  He applied for disability benefits in
September 1997 alleging disability as of December 24, 1993.  His claim was denied, and
he re-applied in October 2001, alleging disability due to emphysema, seizures, and
diabetes mellitus.  
Corley’s benefits were again denied, and he subsequently presented his
claims in a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.  After reviewing medical reports
3and hearing testimony from Corley and a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that
Corley’s impairments did not meet the standard for disability under the Social Security
Act at any time before his date last insured.  
The Appeals Council denied Corley’s request to review the ALJ’s decision,
and Corley subsequently filed an action against the Commissioner in the District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  The Court granted the Commissioner’s motion
for summary judgment and this appeal followed.
II.
We have previously set forth our standard of review in cases involving an
appeal from the denial of disability benefits.  We have instructed:
The role of this Court is identical to that of the District Court, 
namely to determine whether there is substantial evidence to 
support the Commissioner’s decision.  The Court is bound by 
the ALJ’s findings of fact if they are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record.  Substantial evidence has been defined 
as ‘more than a mere scintilla.  It means such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.’
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d
900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995)) (internal citations omitted).  In determining whether substantial
evidence exists, “we are not permitted to weigh the evidence or substitute our own
conclusions for that of the fact-finder.”  Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir.
2002) (citing Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992)).
4In order to qualify for benefits, a person must be disabled as defined by the
Social Security Act and its accompanying regulations as of his date last insured.  Burns,
312 F.3d at 118.  For Corley, his date last insured was December 31, 1998.  The Act
defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.”  42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A)
(2002). 
The ALJ determines whether a claimant qualifies for benefits by applying a
five-step test.  20 C.F.R. § 416.920.  The ALJ concluded at step one that Corley had not
been engaged in substantial gainful activity, and at step two that he suffered an
impairment of emphysema and coronary artery disease prior to his date last insured, but
that his diabetes mellitus and seizure disorder had not been diagnosed until more than two
years after his date last insured.  20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b), 416.920(c).  In step three, the
ALJ considered the medical records for December 1993 through December 1998, and
concluded that Corley’s emphysema and coronary artery disease did not meet or equal any
of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P of Part 404 (“Listing of
Impairments”).  20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).  
The ALJ continued to step four and found that Corley was unable to
perform his past relevant work, but at step five the ALJ accepted the vocational expert’s
testimony that a person with Corley’s impairments retained the residual functional
5capacity to perform light activity jobs.  20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 416.920(f).  The ALJ
thus concluded that Corley was not disabled and denied him benefits.
III.
On appeal, Corley makes four arguments attacking the ALJ’s decision. 
First, he argues that the ALJ committed error by refusing to accept as binding the opinion
of a Social Security consultive examiner that he was limited to sedentary work as of his
date last insured.  There is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision to reject the
opinion of the examiner.  
The examiner, Dr. Naji, examined Corley one time for the purpose of
determining his eligibility for benefits.  He was not a “treating physician” whose opinion
would be entitled to deference.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502.  Dr. Naji concluded that
Corley was limited to sedentary work based only on Corley’s own statements and a
simple bending exercise.  He did not conduct any appropriate objective medical tests to
assess Corley’s impairments, such as a stress-test, electrocardiograph, or exercise test. 
See Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that an unsupported
diagnosis is not entitled to significant weight).
In addition, Dr. Naji’s conclusion that Corley can perform only sedentary
work is inconsistent with Corley’s self-reported activities.  Corley reported that he
performs such activities as walking up to one mile per day, grocery shopping, and
6mowing his lawn.  The evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that the examiner’s opinion
was not entitled to great deference.
Corley’s second argument is that the ALJ erred by failing to factor into the
assessment of his credibility the fact that he had a long and productive work history.  In
support of this argument, Corley relies on cases in which courts have viewed the
testimony of claimants with long and productive work histories as highly credible. 
However, in each of these cases the claimant not only had a long and productive work
history, but also showed evidence of severe impairments or attempted to return to work,
and neither of these circumstances exist here.  See, e.g., Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606
F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1979). Therefore, the ALJ did not err by failing to afford Corley
heightened credibility based solely on his work history.
Corley’s third argument is that the ALJ erred in failing to give presumptive
credibility to his alleged disability onset date. This argument fails because the ALJ did not
dispute Corley’s asserted onset date of the emphysema and coronary artery disease.  As to
the onset date of his diabetes and seizure disorder, the medical evidence shows that
Corley was not diagnosed with these disorders until September 2001– over two years
after his date last insured.
Finally, Corley argues that the hypothetical question the ALJ posed to the
vocational expert was defective.  A hypothetical question posed to a vocational expert
must accurately reflect a claimant’s impairments that are supported by the record.  See
Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987); Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984).  Corley claims that the question was defective because it
assumed that he would be able to perform “light work.”  
The ALJ did not err when he refused to accept Dr. Naji’s conclusion that
Corley could only perform sedentary work.  He also did not err when he refused to accept
Corley’s testimony that he could only perform sedentary work because that testimony was
inconsistent with Corley’s own reports of his daily activities.  The ALJ therefore did not
have to incorporate into his hypothetical question any assumption that Corley was limited
to sedentary work, because such a limitation is not supported by the record.  The District
Court correctly concluded that the ALJ’s hypothetical question accurately reflected the
findings supported in the record by substantial evidence.
IV.
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security.
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